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Guarding the Altar
Physiological Restrictions
and the Rise of
State Intervention in Matrimony
by MICHAEL GROSSBERG*
Marriage law guarded the entrance to the most vital if most
common relationship of nineteenth century America, matrimony.
Almost ninety per cent of all men and women passed through its
portals. In the 1790s Connecticut Supreme Court Reporter Jesse
Root expressed the central assumptions of nuptial law when he de-
clared that the idea that "one man should be joined to one woman in
a constant society of cohabiting together, is agreeable to the order of
nature, is necessary for the propagation of their offspring, and to
render clear and certain the right of succession." I Root offered a
lawyerly version of the popular belief that stable marriages per-
formed critical roles in the society by producing healthy children,
curbing sexual passions, and protecting private accumulation. Faith
in these assumptions never waivered amid the tumult of the century.
Yet the law did not remain static or hidebound; on the contrary, it
underwent periodic revisions as its authors struggled to insure that
matrimony met its responsibilities.
Legal changes occurred in large part because post-
revolutionary America witnessed the final demise of an earlier colo-
nial conviction that society was best protected by compelling brides
and grooms to submit to community and family matrimonial super-
vision. In its wake came confusion over how tightly to regulate
courtship and wedlock. Major alterations in the middle class concep-
tion of the family complicated the issue. The family went through a
* Assistant Professor of History and Lecturer in Law, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity. I would like to thank various colleagues for their comments on various drafts
of this article:Morton Keller, Edward Byers, Judith Taylor, Dirk Hartog, Bertram
Wyatt-Brown, Brian Gratton, and the members of the Wellesley College History
Seminar. Funding for the research was made possible by Crown Fellowships from
Brandeis University.
1. 1 Root xxvvi (Ct. 1789-1793); see also Paul H. Jacobson, American Marriage
and Divorce (New York 1951).
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process of redefinition as capitalist enterprise and the republican
state gradually took over many of its most important productive and
public functions. A more private conception of the family emerged,
one in which the household occupied a narrower place within a
secular society but whose heightened emotional and affective bonds
and socialization duties came to be seen as particularly crucial to
social welfare. 2 The tendency to rely on the private family as the
society's primary institution for confronting the vicissitudes of
nineteenth century economic and social dynamics greatly exacer-
bated the problems of legal definition. Out of these developments
came a series of policies which tried to guard the nuptial entrance by
balancing a doctrinaire faith in individual autonomy with an increas-
ingly insistent demand that the state oversee the vital act of
matrimony.
Telling changes in the focus of nuptial law disclose a tension
that existed between contractual freedom and state intervention
throughout the century, a tension that permeated the entire legal
system. As in other areas of the law, state after state shifted the
center of attention in nuptials from an initial promotion of private
rights to a later imposition of greater public controls. Early in the
period marriage law paralleled the larger distributive trend of legal
development, including its hostility to unproductive vested interests
and undynamic policies. In matrimony, as in many aspects of com-
merce, legislators and judges, remade the law to compel couples to
make their own agreements. Such a free market approach to an issue
like matrimony points to a broad early nineteenth century determi-
nation to make the law of domestic relations an ally not a competitor
in the creation of a society based as much as possible on the
bourgeois ideal of unregulated private competition and individual
choice.3
Events gradually undermined this approach to nuptials. The
evangelical and romantic ideals of the family as a refuge, popular in
the Jacksonian era, became a Victorian orthodoxy. Deviations from
it, such as rising divorces, falling white birth rates, and expanding
women's rights, came to be seen as threatening. Family advice writ-
ers, clergymen, jurists, and social critics mourned the loss of san-
2. Barbara Laslett, "The Family as a Public and Private Institution: An Historical
Perspective," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 35 (1973), 480-92; Kirk Jeffery,
"The American Family as a Utopian Retreat from the City," Soundings, 55 (1972),
21-41; John P. Demos, "The American Family in Past Time," American Scholar, 13
(1974), 442-46; Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life (New York
1976); Carl Degler, At Odds, Women and the Family in America from the Revolution
to the Present (New York 1980), chap. 1.
3. See for example Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American.Law (Cam-
bridge, Ma. 1977), esp. 56-58; William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common
Law (Cambridge, Ma. 1975), esp. chap. 8.
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tified values of the home. Apprehension over the family dominated
public discussions of marriage law during the late nineteenth century
and into the next. Calls for greater attention to the social impact of
loosely governed nuptials testify to growing anxiety about the role of
matrimony in maintaining what appeared to be an increasingly un-
steady secular and overly permissive social order. Abba Woolson, a
prominent eastern feminist, voiced that concern in 1873 when she
cautioned: "'whatever tends to deteriorate the marriage relationship
and consequently the home, tends to deteriorate the whole machin-
ery of life whether social or political." 4 As in so many areas of
conflict in late nineteenth century America, state intervention began
to be touted as the solution to these difficulties. Steadily rising pub-
lic regulation of nuptials emerged as the final response to the central
issue of nineteenth century marriage law: defining the boundaries
between private nuptial rights and state marital responsibilities.'
The evolution of one marital restriction, physiological pro-
hibitions, vividly reveals the ideas and interests which kept altering
the balance in nuptial law. The matrimonial curb had four major
categories: race, age, kin ties, and mental and physical health. 6 Gen-
eral policies developed over the course of the century and followed
in most jurisdictions rather than local or regional anomolies offer the
most suggestive evidence of the evolving character of marriage law.
From public arenas, such as courtrooms, legislative chambers, and
legal and lay journals, came the clearest pronouncements on the
physiological traits considered sufficiently threatening to warrant
formal prohibition and on the shifting responsibilities of the be-
trothed and the state.
The development of the nuptial restriction also discloses some
sources of legal change generally overlooked in discussions of
4. Women in American Society (Boston 1873); and see Walter E. Willcox, "The
Marriage Rate in Michigan, 1870-1890," Publications of the American Statistical
Association, 4 (1895), 1-11; Frank G. Cook, "The Marriage Celebration in the United
States," Atlantic Monthly, 61 (1888), 527; Ibid., "Reform in the Marriage Celebra-
tion," Ibid., 681; "Why is Single Life Becoming More General?" The Nation, 6
(1868), 190-91.
5. For a more thorough examination of these issues see Michael Grossberg, "Law
and the Family in Nineteenth Century America," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Brandeis University 1979), esp. chaps. 3, 4, 10, 11.
6. The other major physiological restraint, impotence, played a very small role in
nineteenth century marriage law. For a discussion of the subject see Devanbaugh v.
Devanbaugh, 5 Paige 554 (New York 1836). Traditional English grounds for denying
the right to wed provided the foundation for most physiological restrictions. Each
prohibition originated in the consensual nature of matrimony and represented a dif-
ferent manner of nullifying a union due to defective consent. For English law see
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London 1765-1769), I1:
Thomas Poynter, A Concise View of the Doctrines and Practices of the Ecclesiastical
Courts (London, 2nd. ed., 1825), esp. chaps. 1-6.
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nineteenth century American legal history. The major interpretive
models used to analyze the period, such as J. Willard Hurst's pro-
gression from 'release of energy' to 'control of the environment' or
Morton Horwitz's shift from 'instrumentalism' to 'formalism', have
been almost exclusively, and often narrowly, economic. They have
encouraged a rather rigid deterministic set of arguments which
exclude social and cultural influences on legal development. In other
words, legal history has developed its own version of the 'reason-
able man' and like the original fiction he (and much less often she) is
generally a one-dimensional economic actor who is embroiled in
controversies involving 'hard' not 'soft' law. A look at the
physiological restraints on matrimony can help correct this historical
oversight by enlarging the roster of causal elements at work within
the nineteenth century legal system. It can do so in particular by
identifying some of the social and cultural forces which produced the
impulse to look to state intervention as the solution to the problems
of an increasingly expansive, diverse, and class conscious society.
The impulse has been explained almost uniformly in economic
terms, but the sources of state intervention.ran much deeper within
nineteenth century America than such explanations suggest. 7
Racial Barriers
Alterations in racial prohibitions within nuptial law provide tell-
ing examples of changes in nineteenth century legal policies. The
ban on interracial marriage made a dramatic transition from a major
anomoly in American marriage law to a representative model for the
imposition of physiological restrictions on brides and grooms. Un-
like most of the curbs, the racial bar was an American innovation
without English precedent. First imposed by several colonial as-
semblies, it became a regional phenomenon after the Revolution.
The most racially conscious states formally banned such unions, the
rest made the more common antebellum assumption that private
prejudice would accomplish the same result.'
The use of public authority to regulate interracial unions made
the ban exceptional. In most situations the early nineteenth century
7. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth
Century United States (Madison, Wis. 1956); Ibid., Law and Social Process in United
States History (New York 1972), esp. 8-9; Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law; Lawrence E. Friedman, Contract Law in America (Madison, Wis. 1965); for an
exception to the general trend see Morton Keller, Affairs of State, Public Life in Late
Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge, Ma. 1977), esp. chaps. 12, 13.
8. Jonathan Alpert, "The Origins of Slavery in the United States, The Maryland
Precedent," American Journal of Legal History, 14 (1970), 189, 109-11; Harvey
Applebaum, "Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem,"
Georgetown Law Journal, 53 (1964), 49-50.
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statutory and common law of marriage encouraged the decline of
strict state controls as well as of kin and religious supervision of
nuptials. Marriage law championed freedom of choice. Common law
marriage, unions consummated without formal ceremonies or public
involvement, stood as the most extreme symbol of a commitment to
what might be labeled a free marriage market. State judges like
Chancellor James Kent of New York made the most important con-
tributions to this legal policy by formally loosening the already de-
clining colonial nuptial laws, which had demanded banns, licenses,
parental consent, and other public acts for legally valid marriages. In'
the place of public supervision, the law endorsed self-policing as the
primary check on brides and grooms.9
As in so many areas of antebellum life, though, race ran like a
fault line through marriage law. The formal ban on interracial unions
had a dubious legal standing because it lacked an English pedigree.
Its legal bastardy was evident in the first systematic presentation of
American marriage law, Joel P. Bishop's 1852 Commentaries on the
Law of Marriage and Divorce.'0 One of the earliest comprehensive
American legal treatises, Bishop sought to impose order on the maze
of statutory and judge-made law governing wedlock. The book was
as well an aspect of the larger campaign by mid-century treatise
writers to rationalize the diffuse legal culture of America and to
protect the policy-making prerogatives of the bench and bar by
creating a national common law. Such an endeavor seemed so
necessary and rewarding that Bishop gave up a successful practice
to pursue a full-time career of legal investigation and writing."
An active opponent of slavery, Bishop nonetheless made a par-
ticularly revealing attempt to make room for the racial curb in the
common law tradition. He cited with approval an 1841 Kentucky
9. For examples of such judicial actions see Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 51 (N. Y.
1809); Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binn. 405 (Pa. 1814); Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N.H. 268
(1820); Patton v. Philadelphia, I La. An. 98 (1846); Graham v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 503
(1852); Hargrove v. Thompson, 31 Miss. 211 (1856). For discussions of colonial
family policies see John Demos, A Little Commonwealth, Family Life in Plymouth
Colony (New York 1970); Edmund Morgan, The Puritan Family (Boston 1944);
Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society (Cambridge, Ma.
1976), 91-110; Lorena Walsh, "Till Death Do Us Part, Marriage and Family in Seven-
teenth Century Maryland," in Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman, The
Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society and
Politics (New York 1979), 129-52. For explanations of this regulatory reluctance see
James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law (Boston 1950), 48; William E.
Nelson, "Officeholding and Power Wielding: An Analysis of the Relationship Be-
tween Structure and Style in American Administrative History," Law and Society
Review, 10 (1976), 191-219.
10. Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce (Boston 1852).
11. Morton Horwitz, "Treatise Literature," Law Library Journal, 69 (1976), 460-
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decision which rejected property claims based on the marriage of a
white woman and a black man. The justices had ruled that because
no formal proof of the union had been presented they had to assume
that such interracial relations had been "concubinage" rather than
matrimonial." Bishop endorsed the reasoning by comparing the de-
cision with an English opinion nullifying an alleged marriage be-
tween a countess and her footman. An English tribunal had accepted
the aristocrat's contention that disparity of rank substantiated her
claim that she "had chosen to indulge in licentious passion rather
than degrade herself from her high station by espousing her menial
servant." 1 3 Bishop's easy equation of American racial antipathies to
English class prejudices illustrated not only the unceasing determi-
nation of American lawyers to find English roots for all legal doc-
trines, but more importantly the obvious correlation between class
and race implicit in the racial prohibition.
Yet such legal sophistry merely emphasized that the regulatory
power of the state provided the only secure authority for the ban.
The firm commitment of state court judges to common law nuptial
rights made it impossible to impose the restriction without legislative
initiative. Bridling at its powerlessness to annul the inheritance
rights of the children of a marriage between an emancipated black
woman and a white man without a statutory ban, the South Carolina
Supreme Court reluctantly agreed with the conclusion of a lawyer in
an 1842 property dispute: "although such marriages are revolting,
and justly regarded as offensive to public decency, they are not
contrary to existing law." 14 The willingness of most southern and a
few northern legislatures to supply such statutes testifies to the
powerful fears evoked by racial intermarriage, fears potent enough
to prod state intervention in a generally anti-statist society.
When such statutes existed they won judicial endorsement. A
dramatic turnabout by one of the eminent jurists of the Old South
documents the intense pressures on the bench exerted by fears of
race 'amalgamation' that threatened, in southern terms, social order
and family legitimacy. North Carolina Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin
faced two appeals in 1832 in which Caucasian grooms sought to
annul their marriages with white women by charging nuptial fraud.
The men claimed that their mates, with whom they had shared inti-
mate premarital relations, had given birth to mulatto children and
thus had falsely held themselves out as fit marital partners.
In the first decision, Ruffin invoked the standard common law
rule on the issue and refused to annul Marville Scoggin's marriage.
12. Armstrong v. Hodges, 2 B. Monroe 69.
13. Forbes v. Countess of Strathmore. Ferg. Cons. Law Rep. 113; Bishop, Mar-
riage and Divorce (2nd. ed. 1856), 74-75, and see 183.
14. Bowers v. Newmann, 2 McMill. 472, 381.
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The law insisted that courting couples themselves scrutinize each
other and then take the consequences of their thoroughness. Caveat
emptor governed marital contracts as it did other bargains. Ruffin
told Scoggins, "[t]here is in general no safe rule but this: that per-
sons who marry take each other as they are." ,5 But community
sanctions about race-mixing forced the Chief Justice to change his
position. In the second opinion, Ruffin publicly acknowledged the
popular and professional opposition his first ruling had stirred. As a
popularly elected judge and a former speaker of the state assembly,
he clearly was politically sensitive enough to know when to bow to
popular will. Though he admitted that his reading of the appeal
brought by Jesse Barden against his wife Ann would have led him to
issue the same verdict as in the Scoggins case, he modified the rule
of fraud and dissolved the marriage. Ruffin concluded his opinion
with the frank declaration: "This is a concession to the deep-rooted
and virtuous prejudices of the community on the subject." 16 The
judiciary's almost total approval of the racial ban at the same time it
jealously guarded most nuptial rights exposes the singular ability of
community values, in this case, racist notions, to alter the early
nineteenth century bench's larger commitment to a free marriage
market.
The legitimacy of this solution to interracial marriage came into
question when the fall of the Confederacy and the emancipation of
the slaves led to a crisis in marriage law. The enlarged legal personal-
ity of blacks created by Reconstruction civil rights legislation and
constitutional amendments threatened to undermine the prewar
foundation for racial distinctions in matrimony. A resurgence of
anxiety over racial purity and the determination of whites to retain
class and sexual hegemony over their former bondspersons undercut
the few radical attempts at nuptial equality. Instead, as the ever-
present phobia of interracial sexuality intensified, demands for re-
newed state intervention multiplied. Legislatures in the south and a
few mid-western states responded by reenacting antebellum statutes
or passing new prohibitory legislation. In effect, these statutes
placed severe limits on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
and other Union measures regarding race.1 7
15. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 3 Dev. 535 (N. C. 1832).
16. Barden v. Barden, 3 Dev. 548. See also State v. Hooper, 5 Ire. 201 (N. C.
1844); Commonwealth v. Isaac, 5 Rand. 634 (Va. 1826): Tindall v. Johnson, 5 Mo.
180 (1838): State v. Brady, 9 Hump. 74 (Tenn. 1848).
17. R. Carter Pittman, "The Fourteenth Amendment: Its Intended Effect on
Anti-Miscegenation Laws," Virginia Law Review, 42 (1964), 92; Alfred Avins,
"Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: the Original Intent,"
Ibid., 43 (1965), 1227; Forrest G. Wood, Black Scare: the Racist Response to Eman-
cipation and Reconstruction (Berkeley, Ca. 1968), 53-79, 143-53; Vernon L. Wharton,
The Negro in Mississippi (Chapel Hill, N.C. 1967), 150, 227-29.
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It fell on Reconstruction state courts to integrate the revitalized
ban into postwar law. They relied on two major interlocking argu-
ments. First, judges in these cases joined a growing retreat from a
full contractual definition of matrimony. This process of redefinition
led to the classification of marriage as more of a legal status than a
mere contract. Courts and treatise writers like Bishop redefined
marriage to lay a foundation for a new balance in nuptial regulations
which authorized a larger role for the state.'" In litigation involving
interracial marriage, judges started to wax eloquent about the
uniqueness of matrimony and the inherent right of each state to deter-
mine marital capacity. The judiciary's special pleading prevented
the new contractual abilities of blacks from undermining racial
curbs. It particularly forestalled the classification of marriage as a
political rather than a social right under Reconstruction legislation.
The Texas Court of Appeals offered such a defense in 1887. It
ruled on Charles Fasher's petition to overturn his conviction for
violating the state anti-miscegenation law by marrying a black
woman. The judges rejected Frasher's claim that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 made what
had come to be called anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional de-
privations of individual rights. Citing Bishop as an authority, they
threw over the ban a redesigned cloak of states rights and the non-
contractual nature of marriage:
Marriage is not a contract protected by the Constitution of the
United States or within the meaning of the Civil Rights Bill.
Marriage is more than a contract . . . it is a civil status, left
solely by the Federal Constitution and the law to the discretion
of the states under their general power to regulate their domes-
tic affairs.19
After this dogmatic assertion of the ban's legality, the court did grant
Frasher a temporary reprieve from his four year prison term by
sending the case back with the demand that definite proof be offered
of his wife's race.
In addition to diminishing the contractual aspect of marriage,
the judiciary defended the prohibition by arguing that society had to
be protected from serious social and physiological effects arising
from interracial unions. Only state action could insure private regu-
18. Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 25-36; Ibid., New Commentaries on Marriage
and Divorce (Chicago 1891) 1: 181, 34, 35, 25, 420; Ransom H. Tyler, Commentaries
on the Law of Infancy (Albany, N. Y. 1882), 806-09; James Schouler, A Treatise on
Domestic Relations (Boston 1874), 22-24; Frederick H. Hicks, "Marriage and Di-
vorce in State Constitutions," American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
26 (1905), 145-58.
19. Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. of Appeals 263, 276; and see Doc Lomas v. State, 3
Heisk. 287 (Tenn. 1871); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
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larity. Such contentions drew upon a growing body of scientific
racial thought and upon pessimistic views of heredity. The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court expressed these convictions in an 1878 case.
The justices confirmed the legislative right to regulate interracial
matrimony contending that dropping the ban would "legalize inter-
marriage between the races, deteriorating to the Caucasian blood
and destructive of the social and legislative decorum of States." 0
The racial ban thus fell under a growing postwar judicial disposition
to enlarge state supervision of health and safety.
In decisions like these the courts fashioned a sturdy new de-
fense of the racial prohibition. Aaron and Julia Green discovered
this to their dismay in 1877 when an Alabama Supreme Court com-
posed of Redeemers overturned a ruling by their Republican pre-
decessors who had declared the racial ban unconstitutional. The
new bench labeled homes the "nurseries of the States," and won-
dered who could
estimate the evil of introducing into their most intimate rela-
tions, elements so heterogeneous that they must naturally cause
discord, shame, disruption of family circles, and estrangements
of kindred? While with their interior administration, the State
should interfere but little, it is obviously of the highest public
concern that it should, by general laws adapted to the state of
things around them, guard against disturbances from without.
Julia Green, a Caucasian, spent two years in prison as a violator of
the hearth.2 '
Racial hostility and the political chaos of Reconstruction
merged with a growing anxiety about the family evident in the
Alabama opinion to preserve and, indeed, expand the right of states
to intervene in nuptials and ban interracial marriages. As separation
became the chief goal of American race laws, more and more states
used the expanded legal defense to add anti-miscegenation statutes to
their codes and constitutions. By the end of the century at least
twenty-six states and territories prohibited interracial marriages.
22
These statutory revisions strengthened a consistent determination to
use race to limit individual contractual freedom and conversely in-
crease state nuptial authority.
20. Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 2 Bush. 5, 8-9; and see Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321
(1869); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883); Jack Greenberg, Race and American
Law (New York 1959), 344.
21. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 194, overturningBurns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872).
22. Gilbert T. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (Boston 1910), 82;
Chester Vernier, American Family Law (Stanford, Ca. 1932-1938), 1: 204-09; for an
attack on an earlier tendency to treat Indians less harshly than blacks see Isaac
Franklin, "The Indian Before the Law," Yale Law Reivew, 18 (1908-1909), 331.
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Youthful Limits
Modifications in the restrictions placed on youthful marriages
point out why the racial prohibition ceased to be a legal anomaly. No
nineteenth century judge, legislator, or public commentator disputed
the use of age as a legitimate basis for nuptial regulation. All agreed
that below a certain age children could neither physically consum-
mate a marriage nor intellectually understand its significance. Yet
uncertainty lingered over the states' duty to accept marriages
formed during the undefined period between childhood and adult-
hood. It took on legal significance because matrimony customarily
acted as a declaration of individual autonomy and independence and
raised delicate questions about nuptial rights and state
responsibilities.2 :
Early in the nineteenth century most states resolved these un-
certainties in favor of a youthful freedom to wed free of public
restraints. Legislation and judicial decisions adopted this non-
regulatory policy by borrowing traditional English common law age
designations. Under the common law, twelve for women and four-
teen for men stood as the magical ages at which the law conferred
nuptial rights on individuals. Though steeped in feudal ideas of
property protection and common sense notions of sexual develop-
ment, the law on this side of the Atlantic mainly served to protect
aberrant antebellum nuptial vows exchanged by couples who wed
while being below the average middle class marriage age of the early
twenties.2 4
The fate of a few legislative attempts to raise these ages exposes
an anti-regulatory bias embedded in this and other non-racial nuptial
laws. In an effort to close the gap between expected middle class
conduct and the statutes, several legislatures increased the statutory
age of marriage.2 5 Yet New York's 1830 legislative attempt to set the
minimum marriage ages at fourteen and seventeen was reconsidered
and repealed. Critics like Chancellor Kent vigorously challenged the
revision as a violation of common law rights.2 6 Lucius Chittenden, a
Vermont lawyer who edited the second edition of Tapping Reeve's
Law of Baron and Femme (the first American volume on family law)
argued that such statutes rested on mistaken notions of policy.
23. Joseph F. Kett, Rites of Passage (New York 1977), chap. 1.
24. Henry Swineborn, A Treatise on Spousals or Matrimonial Contracts (London
1686), 18-28, 34, 47-49; Blackstone, Commentaries, 1: 436; T. E. James, "The Age of
Majority," American Journal of Legal History, 4 (1960), 31-32; Thomas Monahan,
The Pattern of Age at Marriage in the United States (Philadelphia 1950), 1: 103.
25. Tapping Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme (New York, 2nd. ed. 1843),
200-201; Ibid., (4th ed. 1862), 313-14.
26. Ibid.
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Though the acts may be "useful to prevent early marriages," he
urged that the better policy remained the common law's vindication
of individual choices and accountability. By taking that path in Ver-
mont, "a marriage below the age fixed by these statutes is rarely, if
ever, met with." 2 7
Courts rendered other laws ineffective. In 1854 the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court eviscerated an 1835 act similar to
the aborted New York statute. The justices issued a writ of habeas
corpus to the widow Susan Hervey and told her she must release her
thirteen year old daughter. The girl had wed Thomas Parton against
her mother's wishes. Hervey's plea that the new Mrs. Parton had
been deceived did not convince the court, which admonished her:
in regulating the intercourse of the sexes, by giving its highest
sanctions to the contract of marriage, and rendering it, as far as
possible, inviolable . ..and to prevent fraudulent marriages,
seductions, and illegitimacy, the common law has fixed that
period in life when sexual passions are usually first developed
as the one when infants are deemed to be at the age of consent
and capable of entering into the contract of marriage.
The judges then ruled that in the absence of a specific command
from the General Court declaring premature marriages void, they
would treat legislative standards as "directory" not compulsory.
Such firm assertions of judicial discretionary power hastened the
privatization of marriage law. Judges used that power to render age
and other statutory controls such as licenses, witnesses, and
registration voluntary. Their opinions cleared the path for common
law marriage. 2
As these examples indicate, initial nineteenth century laws gov-
erning nuptial ages replaced an earlier reliance on communal and
parental supervision with individual self-determination. They left
the regulation of youthful marriage primarily to the dictates of court-
ship, personal calculations of maturity and economic resources, and
the moral and financial arguments of family and community. If ina-
bility to support a family, fears of disinheritance, or arguments
against hasty weddings did not extinguish the flames of youthful
desire then few legal barriers stood in the path of a young couple. A
27. Lucicus E. Chittendon, quoted in Reeve, Baron and Femme (2nd ed.), 200n.
28. Parton v. Hervey, I Gray 119, 121; and see Goodwin v. Thompson, 2 Greene
329 (Ia. 1849); Koonce v. Wallace, 7 Jones 194 (N. C. 1859); Bishop Marriage and
Divorce (2nd ed.), 162; Governor v. Rector and Ryford, 10 Hump. 57 (N. C. 1849).
29. Pool v. Pratt, I D. Chip. 252 (Vt. 1814); Aymar v. Roff, 3 Johns. Chan. 49 (N.
Y. 1817); American Jurist, 20 (1839), 275-76; Arthur Calhoun, A Social History of the
American Family (Cleveland 1917), 11: 12, 22, 28-31; Guim Griffis Johnson, "'Court-
ship and Marriage in Antebellum North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Re-
view, 8 (1931), 32.
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free market view of a contract that most Americans assumed would
be binding for life reflected a prevalent belief that social and per-
sonal influences could more effectively deter undesirable unions
than could state intervention. Such assumptions were nourished on
the period's definition of liberty which included a strong distrust of
governmental interference in community and family life. The age
laws also perpetuated the conviction that individuals should be al-
lowed to decide their own fate and then be held to the conse-
quences.2 9 Such a policy added legal support to a more general social
evolution described by Daniel Scott Smith. He has identified a
gradual movement from the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
turies' "stable, parental-run marriage system" to the nineteenth
century's "stable, participant-run marriage system." The transition
encouraged a rel'iance not on the state but on internalized restraint
and individual conscience in mate selection. The general legal bias in
favor of individual decision-making and risk-taking enhanced
juvenile nuptial prerogatives by undermining the legitimacy of fam-
ily and state controls at the same time the law promoted private
economic authority. °30
After the nation passed mid-century, however, these lax nuptial
policies came under attack. Critics of nuptial mores from the profes-
sions, the press, and new reform organizations like the Social Purity
Alliance singled out young brides and grooms as prime sources of
marital instability. In 1901 Stanford Professor George E. Howard, a
pioneer sociologist, summarized almost fifty years of protest against
lax marital age regulation with the query: "majority is the law's
simple devise for securing mental maturity in the graver things of
life. Is not wedlock as serious a business as making a will or signing a
deed?" His question implied both the legal answer and his dissatis-
faction with the timidity of nuptial controls on the young. Howard,
who became a crusader for numerous progressive causes, called
youthful marriages a "fruitful source of evil" and urged legislators
to deny them legal recognition. 31
Like their response to persistent demands for state intervention
in commerce which required a devaluation of individual economic
rights, many lawmakers reacted to the appeals of reformers like
Howard by imposing limits on youthful nuptial rights. A series of
acts in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth succeeded in
30. Smith, "Parental Power and Marriage Patterns: An Analysis of Historical
Trends in Hingham, Massachusetts," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 35 (1973),
426; see also Calhoun, The American Family, II: 32.
31. Quoted in Fred S. Hall and Mary Brooke, American Marriage Laws (New
York 1921), 18; and see W. C. Robinson, "The Diagnostics of Divorce," Journal of
Social Science, 14 (1881), 136; Noah Davis, "Marriage and Divorce," North Ameri-
can Review, 139 (1884), 32; David Pivar, The Purity Crusade: Sexual Morality and
Social Control, 1868-1900 (Westport, Ct. 1973), esp. 104-05, 139-46.
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raising the average national statutory age of marriage to sixteen for
women and eighteen for men. By 1906 the legal trend had become so
commonplace that only seventeen states and territories clung to the
old common law standard of twelve and fourteen. 31
These nuptial law revisions occurred amidst a broader reas-
sessment of the social and economic place of the young in American
life. Persuaded by educators, physicians, and reformers like How-
ard, legislators began legally to segregate youths through compul-
sory school laws, to provide special courts for them with vast
discretionary power over status offenses, as well as to limit nuptial
freedom. These statutes used the law to protect a Victorian concep-
tion of youthful development and marital conduct by prolonging
childhood and by saving children from themselves and their mis-
guided parents though the forced imposition of such mores as self-
restraint, educational advancement, delayed-gratification, and
domesticity. Howard and other critics of the family firmly believed
that these traits held some of the keys to marital bliss and should be
imposed by coercive state action. 33
The new marriage age laws, like many other post-Civil War
legislative interventions into what had been considered private mat-
ters, received a mixed judicial review. In response to statutory in-
itiatives in economic affairs such as railroad regulation the bench
developed a stout defense of what it considered to be common law
liberties to contract and use private property. 34 The new nuptial laws
posed similar challenges to the reigning judicial conception of the
right to wed. In particular, despite-the rising chorus of complaints
against youthful marriages, judges and their professional allies re-
tained a greater faith in the social utility of nuptial freedom than did
family reformers. As a major legal theorist of the era, Francis Whar-
ton, put it: encouraging early marriage had become "as much a part
of the distinctive policy of the United States as to discourage such
marriages [was] part of the distinctive policy of Europe." He urged
courts to "sustain matrimonial capacity in all cases of persons ar-
rived at puberty . .. ,31
32. Monahan, Pattern of Age at Marriage, II: 333-38.
33. Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers, the Invention of Delinquency (Chicago
1969); Steven L. Schlossman, Love and the American Delinquent, the Theory and
Practice of Progressive Jurisprudence (Chicago 1977); Elen Ryerson, The Best-Laid
Plans, America's Juvenile Court Experiment (New York 1978); Keller, Affairs of
State, 464-67, 481-82, 483.
34. Keller, Affairs of State, chaps. 5, 8, 9, 11: Clyde Jacobs, Law Writers and the
Courts (Berkeley 1954); Robert S. Hunt, Law and Locomotives, The Impact of the
Railroad on Wisconsin Law in the Nineteenth Century (Madison, Wis. 1958); Arnold
M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law (Ithaca, N. Y. 1960); William
Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (Chicago 1966).
35. A Treatise on the Conflicts of Law (Rochester, N. Y. 3rd ed. 1905), 1: 332-33.
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Confronting disputes over the scope of the vaguely worded age
regulations, judges often had to choose between the settled common
law policy of limited state interference and the new legislative re-
straints put on youthful nuptial rights. In most cases where they
could use their discretion, judges chose the common law. The
bench treated marriages as voidable when one or both parties wed
below the new statutory ages. If the union continued after the
spouses had reached these ages, it became permanent. The Supreme
Court of Nevada followed this reasoning in finding the 1869 marriage
of Jennie C. Dirks valid even though she had wed while three years
under the new statutory age of sixteen. The court considered the
ceremony before a justice of the peace "a valid binding
contract." :6
Judges like those in Nevada obviously did not consider youthful
unions as inherently suspect as did critics of family life. In an 1876
bigamy appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tions of reformers like Howard by favorably comparing violations of
the age restrictions to infractions the judges considered much more
serious. They swept aside Thomas Beggs' attempt to have his first
marriage declared null and void because he had wed when he was
below the statutory age of seventeen. The justices concluded that
the legislature had not intended to punish such violations as harshly
as they did transgressions of other restrictions such as the ban on
incestuous unions. They contended that a marriage within the "age
of consent may be indiscrete, may disturb the peace of families and
may subject youth and inexperience to the acts of the cunning and
the unscrupulous, but it is wanting in the vicious and corrupting
properties of the incestuous connection which contravenes the voice
of nature, degrades the family, and offends decency and morals." 
37
Such opinions reflected the persistence within the judiciary of
an earlier endorsement of self-regulation and a judicial determina-
tion to oversee, and if necessary repel, major legislative invasions of
nuptial law. In 1886 Christopher Tiedeman, one of the leading late
nineteenth century opponents of what he labeled 'state activism,'
endorsed such judicial defenses of common law rights in his highly
influential treatise on the limitations of police power. He urged that
youth not be made a "disqualification to the entrance into a com-
pletely valid marriage." 38 This stance epitomized his belief, as he
explained in an 1890 volume, that the notion that "government has
36. Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 6 Nev. 63, 67 (1870).
37. Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. 108, 112-13; and see People v. Slack, 15 Mich. 192
(1867); State v. Cone, 86 Wis. 498 (1893); Williams v. Hodges, 101 N. C. 300 (1888);
Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565 (1887).
38. A Treatise on the Limitations of the Police Power in the United States (St.
Louis 1886), 531.
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the power to banish evil from the earth" merely represented another
reincarnation of an "old superstition."' 3 9
The new age legislation and its judicial reception provide clear
illustrations of the emerging character of post-Civil War marriage
law. The debate points both to the necessity of turning to the state to
alter marriage law and the difficulties of doing so. A new relationship
had developed in antebellum America between individual brides and
grooms and the state. The traditional hierarchical, patriarchal family
of the colonial era no longer existed as a buffer between the two.
Instead, the legal identity of each potential spouse had its source in
his or her individuality. As the law defined matrimony, an act be-
tween two individuals and the state, strengthened nuptial controls
would have to come directly from public authorities and not from the
family or other intermediaries like the church. But trying to con-
struct a broadly supportable definition of the public interest in nup-
tials to win the allegiance of all those involved in marriage law proved
to be the shoal upon which most attempts broke apart. It was
particularly difficult in the case of youthful marriages because'they
did not engender the intense controversy which had sustained broad
state intervention in interracial unions. Yet judges and legislators
slowly did establish a new balance between state authority and indi-
vidual rights which reduced youthful nuptial freedom by raising the
formal age of marriage. But it was a balance in which the young and
the courts retained large discretionary powers and the state's reg-
ulatory authority, though enhanced, was less extensive than in the
case of interracial marriage. Though the specific interests and con-
cerns varied in each case, similar revaluations of state power and
contractual freedom occurred across the legal spectrum.
Kin Boundaries
Changes in content and intent similar to those in the racial and
age restrictions occurred in another element of the physiological
prohibition, the legal standards governing kin ties. Alterations in
these regulations had a more direct link than did those in the other
two areas to shifting attitudes about nuptial freedom and the state's
responsibility to defend matrimony from biological dangers. An ini-
tial commitment to contractual rights emerged after the Revolution
when state legislatures began to relax the rigid and enclusive statutes
governing kin marriages that had been adopted earlier in the colonial
era. Truly incestuous marriages-that is, between parent and child
or brother and sister-continued to provoke bitter social and legal
denunciations. Since such relationships are rarely formalized, the
39. The Unwritten Constitution of the United States (New York 1890), 76.
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central legal and social issue became the boundary of the kin nuptial
ban.40
Colonial limits had originated in Biblical commands and English
canonical rules governing consanguinity and affinity. These family
ties, the former created though blood bonds and the latter through
matrimony, formed the basis of numerous intricate distinctions,
anyone of which could be used to annul a marriage. Cincinnati editor
Edward Mansfield, who had graduated from Tapping Reeve's Litch-
field Law School and taught law in his adopted city, expressed a
popular view on the issue in 1845 when he tried to stake out the
proper limits of the kin restriction. Admitting that public welfare
demanded some bans on consanguineous unions, he nevertheless
asserted that "the holiness or unholiness of the matrimonial con-
tract, in reference to ties of blood or other moral circumstances is
not considered by law, but left entirely to the jurisdiction of
ecclesiastical bodies or the restraint of conscience." 41
Judgments like Mansfield's sped the gradual liberalization of
many kin taboos. His comment indicates some of the social and
political sources of that development. In a society which had dises-
tablished religion and enshrined individual rights, most kin nuptials
fell outside of what came to be thought of as the proper domain of
public authority. Only true incest appeared to pose a serious enough
danger to warrant state nuptial intervention. These demarcations
may also be a legal recognition of the weakening of kin-bonds during
the course of the nineteenth century. 42
Statutory differences on the issue arose mainly as a result of
first cousin and affinal unions. Sociologist Bernard Farber has dis-
covered two nineteenth century kin systems. In New England and
much of the older South a 'Biblical System' based on English prac-
tice remained in place. It permitted first cousin unions but banned
marriages among various affines. At the same time a 'Western
American System' emerged in the new states of the middle and far
west. Those regions proscribed first cousin unions and authorized
affinal ones. The regional divergence is difficult to explain. It may lie
in different responses to the problem of social stratification and
economic development. The 'Biblical System' helped sustain a
highly stratified family oriented social and economic order by pro-
40. Talcott Parsons, "The Incest Taboo in Relation to Social Structure," in Rose
Lauber Coser, ed., The Family (New York, 2nd ed. 1974), 13-30; Frederick P. Stokes,
"The Incestuous Marriage, A Relic of the Past," University of Colorado Law Re-
view, 36 (1963), 473-74.
41. The Legal Rights, Liabilities, and Duties of Women (Cincinnati, Ohio 1845),
236. For a description of English law see Poynter, Doctrines of Ecclesiastical Courts,
85-118.
42. Degler, At Odds, 104-09.
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viding a formal mechanism for using kin matrimonial alliances to
perpetuate concentrated economic power. The 'Western System'
promoted a more open society by encouraging marriages with a
variety of outsiders and affines and thus expanding the distribution
of family wealth. The regional differences thus may reflect the crea-
tion of legal policies by and for elites who differed in their use of
family alliances to protect or increase their wealth.
43
In this instance, the West prevailed for the major regulatory
development of the early nineteenth century became the gradual
reduction of controls on couples related by affinity. A growing
number of statutes and judicial decisions dissolved such bonds after
the death or divorce of one of the spouses. Massachusetts, Mary-
land, and Connecticut did so in the late eighteenth century, other
states followed their lead in the next. The Vermont Supreme Court
agreed as well in an 1837 land dispute. The justices threw out an
appeal by Amos Blodgett who had questioned the appraisal of some
condemned property because one of the appraisers had married the
sister of the owner's deceased first wife. They not only rejected that
relationship as a ground of disqualification but the judges also re-
pudiated a traditional common law ban against the unions of widow-
ers and their deceased wife's sisters: "though a man is by affinity,
brother to his wife's sister, yet upon the death of the wife, he may
lawfully marry his sister." 4 This ruling was a rejection of the older
Anglo-American policy which had banned such unions as threats to
family unity. It proceeded directly from the new assumption that
matrimony united two individuals not two families. Consequently,
once the original bond ended the remaining spouse could legally wed
almost anyone he or she desired. English law did not permit such
unions until 1907. Thus, as in nuptial age revision of the same era,
individual conscience not the law governed marital choice. 45
A bitter debate in the Presbyterian Church over this issue re-
vealed the waning influence of public controls on the marriages of
individuals formerly related by affinity. Around 1840 the sect de-
frocked the minister of a Fayetteville, North Carolina congregation,
the Reverend McQueen, for marrying his deceased wife's sister. In
an ensuing pamphlet war over the action, all the disputants, some
albeit grudgingly, conceded the propriety of the legislature's with-
drawal from the issue. The disputants quarreled over whether or not
43. Kinship and Class (New York 1971), chap. 3. For a comment on Farber's
analysis see Peter D. Hall, "Marital Selection and Business in Massachusetts Mer-
chant Families, 1700-1900,'" in Michael Gordon, ed., The American Family in
Social-Historical Perspective (New York 1973), 101-14.
44. Blodgett v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27, 30 (1837).
45. George Howard, A History of Matrimonial Institutions (Chicago 1904), 11: 397,
434-35, 474.
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the church itself should enforce the ban. One opponent of the re-
striction taunted his adversaries: "if the prevailing public sentiment
of this nation, sustained by the legislation of all the states but one
[most likely he meant Virginia] is countenancing incest, we need to
know it." Though McQueen finally won reinstatement in 1846, the
debate revealed that traditional nuptial restrictions had to be de-
fended on grounds of public welfare not merely accepted morality.
Such standards ensured that few kin marriages fell within the bound-
aries of the law. 46
Even in the most litigated issue, marriages between uncles and
nieces or aunts and nephews, the courts opposed strict public re-
straints. In 1858 the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to nullify
the marriage of Edward Bowers and his brother's daughter,
Elizabeth, in an estate fight. The court rebuffed an attempt by the
children of Bower's first marriage to deny Elizabeth dower rights
because her marriage violated the ban on incestuous unions. Offer-
ing a common judicial argument used to blunt nuptial laws, the jus-
tices raised the specter of broken marriages and bastardized children
to justify their allegience to the common law. They concluded, "ex-
treme cases of unnatural alliances may be supposed at which the
moral senses could be offended, but hithertofore public sentiment if
not private virtue has repressed all such evils." Though self-policing
had failed to prevent the Bowers' marriage, the South Carolina
bench, like most of its antebellum counterparts, refused to rescind
its endorsement of that system of nuptial supervision of most kin
unions as the judiciary had refused to do in most youthful
marriages .47
Only an influence as potent as racial prejudice or violations of
blood bonds could dislodge the commitment to individual choice
embedded in these early nineteenth century kin nuptial policies. The
transmission of hereditary defects through marriage began to be
considered such a threat around the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. A scientific pessimism first evident in the antebellum defense
of the racial ban slowly spread beyond the racial issue and under-
46. Parsons Cooke, The Marriage Question: Or the Lawfulness of Marrying the
Sister of a Deceased Wife (Boston 1842); and see Domesticus, The Doctrine of Incest
Stated with an Examination of the Question of Whether a Man May Marry His
Deceased Wife's Sister (New York 1817); Clericus, The Arguments of Domesticus on
the Question of Whether a Man May Marry His Deceased Wife's Sister (New York
1817); Johnson, "Courtship and Marriage in North Carolina," 385-86.
47. Bowers v. Bowers, 10 Rich. Eq. 551, 555 (S. C. 1858); and see State v.
Barefoot, 2 Rich. 209 (S. C. 1845); Ward v. Delaney, 23 Miss. 410 (1852); Bonham v.
Bagley, 7 111. 622 (1845); Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met. 451 (Mass. 1845); Kelley v. Neely,
12 Ark. 657 (1852); Reeve, Baron and Femme, 202-04; Bishop, Marriage and Divorce
(2nd ed.), 181-82. Only the gradual elevation of the step-parent/step-child bond to that
of natural family members ran counter to this general trend.
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mined the optimism that had been one of the main pillars of liberal
nuptial law and its aversion to state intervention. A determination to
use marriage law to block the consummation of unions thought to
pose hereditary threats became a major product of this shift in
outlook.
Alterations in the content and defense of the kin prohibitions
offer clues as to the way in which biological fears helped create a
scientific rationale for reorienting the law. In each of the numerous
editions of his treatise on marriage law, Joel Bishop wrote what he
considered to be definitive explanations of the kin restrictions. Yet
where the 1852 volume had relied on traditional justifications for the
ban, the edition he revised twenty years later used medical argu-
ments to question the very propositions he had so earnestly ad-
vanced in the earlier work:
Marriages between persons closely allied in blood are apt to
produce an offspring feeble in body, and tending to insanity in
mind. They are everywhere prohibited; but the more common
reason assigned for the prohibition is, that the toleration of
them would impair the quiet of families, jeopardize female chas-
tity, and hinder the formation of favorable alliances. And while
this reason appears utterly insufficient of itself, it shows how in
the world's history, the promptings of the nature of man fre-
quently carry him in the right direction even where his mere
intellect fails to discern the path.4
Bishop's revision indicated how fully he had been converted to a
biological defense of the incest ban.
Though the relaxation of affinal restrictions, which generated
fewer hereditary anxieties, continued unimpeded, the longstanding
antipathy to consanguineous unions revived and expanded as biolog-
ical fears intensified. Heightened interest in the consequences of kin
unions eroded support for individual nuptial rights and encouraged
public intervention. A legislative attempt to ban those kin marriages
which seemed the most threatenting led to greater statutory uni-
formity around the nation.
By the end of the nineteenth century two significant legislative
developments had transpired. First, the number of state laws ban-
ning first cousin marriages increased. The passage of these curbs,
enacted even though doctors and scientists hotly debated the actual
physiological effects of such marriages, suggests a new inclination to
take no chances with heredity. That stance, in turn, helps explain
the increasingly cautious and often repressive legal environment
within which late nineteenth century innovations in marriage law
occurred. The acts also record another way in which the 'Western
48. Marriage and Divorce (5th ed. 1873), 273-74.
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System' of kin restrictions achieved legal dominance. Second, states
devised more comprehensive nuptial codes which included all pos-
sible family members within the incest ban. Fears for the sanctity of
the family grew so intense that even adopted children found them-
selves under statutory supervision. The new laws prohibited mar-
riages between adopted children and their new parents or siblings. In
addition, most statutes reversed traditional practice and declared
incestuous unions void rather than merely voidable. Some states
even authorized criminal penalties for violations of the ban. By 1900
every state prohibited unions of blood relations. Most ended at first
cousins, but many went a step further to second cousins. The drama-
tic rejection of self-policing symbolized by these enactments stood
as graphic evidence of the late nineteenth century conclusion that
the free marriage market had failed to protect the society from a
major biological threat. Only more vigorous state regulation could
provide such security.4 9
Rising apprehension about the biological and social effects of
incestuous marriages not only weakened popular and professional
resistance to state regulation of nuptials it also eroded judicial sup-
port for contractual rights. Despite the tightened statutes, most
cases coming before the bench continued to be property fights aris-
ing from uncle-niece or aunt-nephew marriages. Thus judges gener-
ally had to resolve estate disputes and not try to forestall the actual
formation what the law now considered socially threatening unions.
A survey of such cases indicates that most courts interpreted the
acts in such a way as to retain the discretion to use common law
rules in applying the more rigorous curbs. Legal authors like Bishop
encouraged such interpretations by arguing that the best protection
for society lay in judge-dominated rather than legislative directed
marriage rules. His advice expressed a widespread determination
among the bench and bar to protect the authority over state policy-
making delegated to them earlier in the century and to oversee the
reallocation of private and public rights occurring after mid-century.
A determination evident not just in matrimony but in all areas of
post-Civil War legal practice.
An 1863 Pennsylvania decision illustrates the new legal envi-
ronment surrounding kin marriages. John Parker married his niece in
1856 but had kept the ceremony a secret. He died in 1861, a year
after a new act prohibiting such marriages, and his wife and mother
fought over his estate. The state supreme court followed the advice
offered by Bishop and interpreted the statute in light of earlier com-
mon law precedents. The justices ruled that since the law contained
no express clause declaring such marriages void they would follow
49. Frederick Stimson, American Statute Law (Boston 1910), 666-67; Vernier,
American Family Law, 1: 173-87.
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the common law practice of treating incest violations as irrelevant
after the death of one of the spouses. They defended their ruling as a
needed protection for legitimacy and inheritance claims based on
functioning marriages. But the judges took it upon themselves pub-
licly to reject an earlier faith that self-policing would control the
problem:
We cannot . . . refrain from stating that such connections are
destructive of good morals and should not only be frowned
upon by the community, but very severely punished; and this is
unquestionably the view of our criminal code.50
In his 1865 Book of Nature, John Aston noted that "it was well
known that marriage between near relatives produces unhealthy and
imperfect children, but the causes of such a result are not generally
understood." 5 By 1900 such doubts had evaporated and with them
a legal tendency to passively tolerate kin violations in defense of
contractual rights. Sociologist George Amer thus could confidently
predict in 1904: "when rational marriage laws prohibit the marriages
of the diseased and the degenerate, the problem of consanguinity
will cease to be of vital importance." 52
Medical Restraints
Amer's declaration discloses the link forged between nuptial
law and the new anxiety over the hereditary effects of matrimony.
The reliance on stronger public marriage regulations produced by
this alliance altered a final component of the physiological prohibi-
tion, the legal assessment of the mental and physical capacity to
wed. Restrictions on the nuptial rights of the insane instituted early
in the nineteenth century grew more out of an attempt to prevent the
victimization of the mentally ill than a desire to inhibit their pro-
creative powers. State legislators and judges used various common
law and statutory controls drawn from English cannon law, Parli-
amentary reforms enacted to protect the insane, common law doc-
trines, and customary practices to develop a post-revolutionary pol-
icy governing the issue.
The law did not make a clear distinction between mental defi-
ciency and insanity. Instead it formally restricted the nuptial rights
50. Parker's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 309, 312 (1863); and see Harrison v. State, 22 Md.
468 (1863); Walter's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 392 (1872); Cummings v. State, 36 Tex. Crim.
Cts. 256 (1896); Boylan v. Deinzer, 45 N. J. Eq. 485 (1889); Mcllvain v. Scheibley, 109
Ky. 455 (1898).
51. The Book of Nature (New York 1865), 50-52.
52. "'Consanguineous Marriages in the American Population," Columbia Studies
in History, Economy, and Public Law, 31 (1908), 95.
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only of those who at the time of their marriage were clearly unable to
lead an independent existence. The prohibition prevented incompe-
tent persons from being compelled to enter a relationship they could
not comprehend and stymied those who preyed on the mental dif-
ficulties of incompetents to gain access to their property. In applying
the law judges eschewed medical definitions of sanity for contractual
ones. A subjective judgment of whether the potential spouse could
manage the common affairs of life and understand the meaning of
matrimony served as the primary gauge of mental fitness for nup-
tials. In this way insanity too fell under the dominion of the free
marriage market. 51
An 1850 New Hampshire ruling, True v. Ranney, epitomizes the
judicial approach. After a twenty-two year old woman had been
whisked away and married in Vermont, her parents sued to annul
the union. They testified that she could not wash or dress herself,
spell or read, use money, tell time, knit or sew, and that-perhaps
most telling to a New England jury-she did not know how to prop-
erly "get a boiled dinner." Affirming the dissolution of the marriage,
Chief Justice John J. Gilchrist declared: "There is every reason to
believe that no person so lamentably imbecile as this young woman
appears to be, could have the remotest idea of the meaning of a
contract for the performance of any of the ordinary duties of life, and
still less of a contract of marriage."" 4
The sad plight of the New Hampshire woman illustrates the
severe state of incompetence which invoked the curb. Instituted
over the dissent of some medical experts, including Isaac Ray, the
leading authority on insanity in antebellum America, the legal policy
resulted in a very limited use of the restriction.55 Equally significant,
while most laypersons and professionals believed that mental dis-
abilities had hereditary origins, few acted upon that belief to insist
upon harsh restrictions on the nuptial rights of incompetents.
Novelist Catherine Sedgwick, whose mother and a brother suffered
from mental illness, expressed such sentiments in an attack on
Horace Mann. The educational reformer, who as a state legislator
had lobbied to create the first Massachusetts lunatic asylum, had
advocated more stringent nuptial controls on the insane. Sedgwick
responded in 1839 that Mann had not weighed the chance of insanity
being repeated in a family against the "certain misery" of inflicting
53. Blackstone, Commentaries, I: 438-39; Browning v. Reane, 2 Phill. 69 (1812);
Turner v. Myers, I Hag. Con. 414 (1808); Middleborough v. Rochester, 12 Mass. 363
(1815); James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (New York 1826-1829), II: 76.
54. 21 N.H. 53, 54-55.
55. See for example Isaac Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insan-
ity (John Harvard ed., Cambridge Ma. 1962 of 1838 ed.).
Vol. XXVI
GUARDING THE ALTAR
"the heaviest curse that could fall upon ... those whose families
have thus been afflicted-of making them as lepers." Even if the
disease broke out in branches of a family, the novelist famous for her
stories of domestic tragedy confidently asserted, "judicious physical
education" and the observance of "sanitive laws, physical, moral,
and intellectual" could "extirpate all disease. ' 56 A society which
resisted biological determinism and which busily constructed asy-
lums with the optimistic faith that even the hereditarily insane could
be rehabilitated easily accepted a loose nuptial standard of mental
capacity .57
In the latter part of the century, growing biological fears tipped
the law away from Sedgwick's position and toward Mann's. A con-
tinued belief in the hereditary sources of mental illness, the failure of
asylums to achieve the cures promised by their founders, along with
apprehension about marital life and a new faith in scientific solutions
to social ills, all combined to shift the focus of professional and lay
interest from rehabilitation to prevention. Language reflected a de-
clining perfectionist faith in individual reformation and the turn to
social coercion. During the 1850s a pejorative new term, feeb-
leminded, came into use as a descriptive label for the mentally ill. 58
Stringent and well-enforced marriage standards for conjugal fitness
became one widely advocated method of intervening in the
reproductive process to prevent the birth of feebleminded children.
Hereditary alarm became so pervasive that even that arch foe of the
active state, Christopher Tiedeman, declared: "If the blood of either
of the parties to a marriage is tainted with insanity there is imminent
danger of its transmission to the offspring, and through the procrea-
tion of imbecile children the welfare of the state is more or less
threatened." 59 Much less confident of the wisdom of the free market
approach to hereditary than to youthful matrimony, Tiedeman ac-
cepted the need for greater public surveillance and reduced contrac-
tual rights.
56. Quoted in Normal Dain, Concepts of Insanity in the United States, 1789-1865
(New Brunswick, N, J. 1864), 180. For cases on the subject see Rawdon v. Rawdon,
28 Als. 565 (1856): Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed 57 (Tenn. 1857); Foster v. Means, Speer's
Eq. 569 (S. C. 1844); Keyes v. Keyes, 22 N.H. 553 (1851): Atkinson v. Medford, 46
Me. 510 (1859).
57. David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum (Boston 1971); Dain, Concepts
of Insanity; Gerald Grob, The State and the Mentally 11, A History of Worcester
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Legal procedures, however, offered little assistance to those
determined to institute more rigorous tests of mental capacity as a
check on nuptial rights. The courts applied legal rather than medical
standards and resisted a general definition in favor of case-by-case
determinations based on precedents like the Ranney decision. As
the Mississippi Supreme Court declared in 1872 after it refused to
annul the marriage of William and Mollie Smith because of Mrs.
Smith's insanity: "We have not seen a case where the presence of
the taint of hereditary insanity .. has of itself been held to be the
cause of dissolving the marriage." 6 0 Only statutes expressly chang-
ing the common law and convincing new arguments in their favor
could wean the bench away from its reading of the law.
Reformers and physicians, increasingly self-confident about
their professional objectivity, met the challenge posed by the
judiciary by devising new attacks and demanding public remedies.
Their efforts culminated in the eugenics crusade. Though erected on
the scaffolding created by canonical and common law impediments
to matrimony, eugenically inspired nuptial laws constituted a major
legal departure. They arose from a new assumption that physical
deficiencies in themselves abrogated individual nuptial rights be-
cause of the State's responsibility to defend itself against unhealthy
offspring and pollution of the marriage bed by disease. In 1910 Har-
vard political scientist Frederick Stimson pinpointed the essence of
the change that made greater public intervention the solution to the
problems posed by heredity: "To-day we witness the startling
tendency for the State to prescribe whom a person shall not marry,
even if it does not prescribe whom they shall. The science of
eugenics . . . will place upon the statute books matters which our
forefathers left to the Lord." 61
The eugenics crusade, which reached its height between 1885
and 1920, had a direct and longlasting effect on marriage law. Under
its sway eugenically inspired restraints on those afflicted with men-
tal and physical maladies expanded the traditional physiological im-
pediments to matrimony. The additions ensured that for the first
time nuptial prohibitions contained explicit medical as well as con-
tractual means of assessing nuptial fitness.
Advocates of biological restrictions touted them as necessary
weapons to defend the nation from degeneration. Sociologist How-
ard complained in a 1901 study that "under pleas of 'romantic love'
60. Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 221, 219 (1872); Waymore v. Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271
(1872); Baker v. Baker, 82 Ind. 146 (1882); St. George v. Biddlefield, 76 Me. 593
(1885); Roether v. Roether, 180 Wis. 24 (1923).
61. American Statute Law, 327; and see Mark S. Hailer, Eugenics (New Brunswick,
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we blandly yield to sexual attraction in choosing our mates, ignoring
the welfare of the race." Appealing for a "higher standard of con-
jugal choice," he contended that experience "shows that in wedlock
natural and sexual selection should play a smaller and artifical selec-
tion a larger role." Here, he declared, "the state has a function to
perform" and then demanded that legislation curtail the nuptial
rights of the unfit.62
Howard's plea discloses both the goals and the limits of the
eugenic marriage law movement. The full program could only be
achieved by treating marriage as state controlled mating. The very
breadth of such a proposal doomed it to the same legal oblivion
reserved for other reforms which required massive increases in state
power such as calls for the nationalization of industry. Nevertheless,
major alterations did occur. Though the most drastic laws affected
only a small segment of the population, they reveal the new reliance
late nineteenth century marriage law reform placed on state
intervention.
In 1895 Connecticut enacted a statute which fulfilled many
eugenic goals. It banned the marriage of feebleminded, imbecilic,
and epileptic men and women under forty-five years of age. The law
imposed a minimum three year prison sentence on violators. The
state supreme court incorporated the act into its supervision of wed-
lock in 1905 when it approved the dissolution of Marion and Roy
Gould's marriage. Marion claimed that her husband had hidden his
epilepsy from her. The justices rejected Roy's contentions that the
new law unconstitutionally abridged private rights:
Laws of this kind may be regarded as an expression of the
conviction of modem society that disease is largely preventible
by proper precautions, and that it is not unjust in certain cases
to require the observation of these, even at the cost of narrow-
ing what in former days was regarded as the proper domain of
individual rights. 63
The Connecticut action encouraged Kansas (1903), New Jersey and
Ohio (1904), and Michigan and Indiana (1905) to impose similar re-
strictions. By the 1930s forty-one states had enlarged the common
law tests of mental capacity with statutes that used terms like luna-
tic, feebleminded, idiot, and imbecile. The statutes and judicial opin-
ions like the Gould decision indicate a willingness to depart from the
62. Matrimonial Institutions, 111: 258; and see Albert Swindlehurst, "Some Phases
in the Law of Marriage," Harvard Law Review, 30 (1916-1917), 148.
63. 78 Conn. 242.
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common law defense of contractual rights in the face of major
threats to public safety. 64
Unlike insanity, few precedents existed for using disease to
restrict matrimony. But during the final decades of the nineteenth
century, apprehension over the transmission of hereditary defects
and contagious diseases, especially venereal disease, inflamed the
public mind. Reformers bombarded the nation with statistical
studies claiming that disease had reached epidemic proportions and
with terrifying horror stories of women and children ruined by male
sexual deviance and disease. Because the "welfare of the human
race is largely bound up in the health and reproductive capacity of
the wife and mother," New York City medical professor Prince A.
Morrow pleaded in a 1904 polemic, the "sanitation of the marriage
relation becomes the most essential condition of social preserva-
tion." A leading member of the hygenic wing of the Social Purity
Alliance, he lamented that through "its instrument, the law, the
State affords the injured wife the doubtful remedy of separation or
divorce, but it does not protect her from this injury." Morrow traced
this "callous indifference" to popular acceptance of the inevitability
of "evil" and to the cynical assumption that the "communication of
disease in marriage" remained a "matter between husband and wife
with which the society has nothing to do." Morrow demanded a
state ban on diseased grooms. 65
The persistent efforts of reformers like Morrow and the public
revulsion they helped induce convinced more and more lawmakers
to enact bans on the marriages of the diseased. In 1899 Michigan
legislators passed an act barring those with syphilis or gonorrhea
from marrying and imposed a criminal penalty on violators. By the
1930s over twenty-six states and territories had enacted such meas-
ures. Generally the statutes were predicated on the concealment of
the disease by the afflicted party. Many of them provided for crimi-
nal punishment and fines when an individual knowingly wed while
infected. 6n
The campaign for medical restrictions in marriage law did not
end with the passage of these acts. Reform shifted from deterrence
64. Jessie Spaulding Smith, "Marriage, Sterilization, and Commitment Laws
Aimed at Decreasing Mental Deficiency," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
5 (1914), 365-66; Vernier, American Family Laws, 1: 190-95.
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to prevention. In 1913 Wisconsin became the first state to heed the
advice of the most determined reformers when it required prospec-
tive grooms to submit to medical tests. Critics complained about the
unreliability of the tests and claimed that they violated individual
rights. But disease-inspired fears, improved tests, and greater
documentation drowned these complaints. Alabama, Louisiana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and
Wyoming had joined Wisconsin by 1930. As others followed-and
began to include brides-prenuptial medical examinations became a
standard procedure.6
The new nuptial controls also elicited general judicial approval
as valid exercises of the now expanding state police power over
matrimony. Many courts did hedge that acceptance by incorporating
the acts into traditional common law disabilities and thus again
retained a degree of discretion. The bench tended to categorize vio-
lations as frauds rather than as criminal transgressions unless
expressly compelled to do so by a statute or indictment. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed that path in the 1898
case of Smith v. Smith. Emma Smith sued for an annulment. The
astonished bride had discovered her husband's syphilitic condition
on their wedding night. He denied it, but a doctor confirmed her
fears. Traditionally illness could not be considered a nuptial fraud
since couples pledged to 'take each other in sickness and health.'
But a series of decisions by the same court, beginning with the 1862
ruling of Reynolds v. Reynolds, had held that nuptial violations
which went to the 'essence' of the matrimonial agreement qualified
as fraud. The court considered Smith's act such a violation. It
warned that no woman would be asked to "sacrifice herself to in-
curable disease and to blight her posterity." 68
The most extreme eugenic measure, sterilization, capped the
effort to curtail the nuptial freedom of the unfit. By permanently
preventing the mentally, physically, and morally defective from
procreating, reformers hoped to allow such unfortunates to rejoin
society and enjoy the solace and controls of matrimony without
endangering society. Indiana passed the first act in 1907. It au-
thorized the sterilization of confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles,
and rapists in state institutions upon the approval of a board of
67. Fred S. Hall, Medical Certification for Marriage (New York 1921); Dr. R. W.
Schulfeld, "Needed Revisions of the Law of Marriage and Divorce in the United
States," Medico-Legal Journal, 15 (1898), 231-39; Tiedeman, Constitutional Limita-
tions, 535; Charles H. Huberick, "Venereal Disease and the Law of Marriage and
Divorce," American Law Review, 37 (1903), 226-36; Edward W. Spencer, "Some
Phases of Marriage Law," Yale Law Journal, 25 (1915-1916), 58-65; Hailer, Eugenics,
141-43.
68. 171 Mass. 404, 407. For a general discussion of marital fraud see Reynolds v.
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experts. By 1931 twenty-seven states had enacted some form of
mandatory sterilization. The acts varied widely in scope; most in-
cluded the feebleminded and imbecilic. 69
As the most drastic invasion of nuptial rights, mandatory sterili-
zation generated intense controversy. Courts in Indiana and New
York declared statutes unconstitutional deprivations of the right to
due process and equal protection of the law. A federal tribunal over-
turned a Nevada act by terming it cruel and unusual punishment.
Repeal or neglect eliminated other statutes or rendered them ineffec-
tive. But in 1927 the United States Supreme Court revealed how
thoroughly state intervention had permeated marriage law when it
approved the sterilization of a thirteen year old Virginia woman.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who had concurred with the 1898
Smith decision while on the Massachusetts bench, asserted: "It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crimes, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind." 70 This vigorous endorsement of the most radical invasion of
what had earlier been considered a private right aptly symbolized
and summarized the new tenor of physiological restrictions on
marriage.
A Progressive Balance
In 1904 while addressing Congress on the need for uniform legis-
lation on marriage and divorce, President Theodore Roosevelt
declared that marriage lay "at the very foundation of our social organi-
zation.' 71 Roosevelt echoed the sentiments Jesse Root had expressed
over a hundred years earlier. But the purpose of the president's
declaration reflected the changes that had occurred in the legal
means of ensuring that matrimony fulfilled its social responsibilities.
Over the course of the nineteenth century nuptial prohibitions and
other martial regulations had not been fundamentally renovated but
they were selectively redrawn to place matrimony securely in the
realm of public as well as private law. The revisions included the
reorientation of the physiological restrictions as well as a burst of
legislation requiring licenses, registration, formal ceremonies, and
other nuptial formalities. The rising belief that family life was too
vital to public order to be left beyond the regulatory reach of the
69. Haler, Eugenics, 130-41; Morrow, Social Disease, 366-69; Joseph P. Chamber-
lain, "Eugenics and the Limitation of Marriage," American Bar Association Journal,
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state encouraged these new nuptial controls. They created a new
balance between public and private rights which remained largely in
place until the mid-twentieth century.
The alterations in marriage law indicate that once the traditional
ideal of family government had withered away only the state had the
authority and legitimacy to take its place as the regulator of nuptials.
Nevertheless, turning to the state was a difficult proposition for a
society that cherished limited government and personal choice in
matrimony as in all other activities. As a result, confusion and un-
certainty reigned over just how to govern courtship and marriage.
Reformers intent on expanding state nuptial authority often clashed
with judges, legislators, and others determined to blunt state inter-
vention into what had been considered private calculation and to
protect the public and private spheres of social and economic life
carved out early in the century. Because of these conflicts the effort
to enlarge the scope of nuptial law achieved uneven results. But in
every category the state ceased to be a silent partner. The growing
presence of the state in matrimony suggests a gradual rejection of an
earlier faith that individual self-interest and voluntary reform could
protect the common good. A new reliance on the state to define and
protect the public interest replaced that older conviction.
The resort to state intervention in nuptials illustrates how com-
mon that impulse became. Changes in marriage law belie the stan-
dard historical focus on state intervention as primarily an economic
act. On the contrary, the use of public power to promote or impose
social and cultural values rivaled in intensity and popularity the
more commented upon struggles over state regulation of commerce
in the latter part of the nineteenth century .72 Though the widespread
nature of state activism has been hinted at, it has rarely been
addressed by legal historians. The most obvious examples, changes
in the law of race, crime, and education or the creation of state
welfare bureaus and institutions, have largely been treated as laying
in historigraphical ghettos too dark to shed much light on general
legal development. But the impulse was much too broad for such
casual dismissals. The widespread reliance on state authority must
be recognized and its sources identified and explained in order to
fully understand the nineteenth century legal system.
Marriage law illustrates how fruitful such investigations may be.
It remained a distinctive category of American law over the course
of the century because it maintained a dynamic relationship to
72. For similar developments in other areas of family law see Linda Gordon,
Women's Body, Women's Right, A Social History of Birth Control In America (New
York 1974); James C. Mohr, Abortion in America (New York 1978): and for a brilliant
analysis of a similar trend in France see Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families,
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changes in family life and in sentiments toward the home as well as
to evolving attitudes about state intervention. The difficulty of locat-
ing a stable consensual foundation for nuptial governance offers a
set of telling examples of the struggle to revise an initial post-
revolutionary commitment to limited government and individual
choice. Yet the legal system succeeded in this case, as in so many
others, in creating a remarkably resilient code, one that required
some acknowledgment and accommodation from all brides and
grooms.
